London, Friday, May 6, 2005 British
secret service reported in July 2002 on Bush's
plans to fabricate evidence to justify attacking
Iraq Actual
text of the secret memorandum reporting a meeting
between British prime minister Tony Blair
and his Intelligence chiefs, July 23,
2002 SECRET
AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES
ONLY
[To:] DAVID
MANNING From: Matthew
Rycroft Date: 23 July 2002 S 195 /02 cc [copied to]: Defence
Secretary [Geoffrey
Hoon], Foreign Secretary
[Jack Straw],
Attorney-General [Lord
Goldsmith], Sir
Richard Wilson,
John Scarlett [of
MI6], Francis
Richards, CDS [Chief of Defence
Staff], C [Sir Richard Dearlove, head of
MI6], Jonathan Powell, Sally
Morgan, Alastair Campbell [of
Blair's staff] IRAQ: PRIME
MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
[2002]Copy addressees and you [David
Manning] met the Prime Minister [Tony
Blair] on 23 July to discuss Iraq. This record is extremely sensitive. No
further copies should be made. It should be shown
only to those with a genuine need to know its
contents. John Scarlett [of MI6, now its new
chief] summarised the intelligence and latest
JIC assessment. Saddam's
regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The
only way to overthrow it was likely to be by
massive military action. Saddam was worried and
expected an attack, probably by air and land, but
he was not convinced that it would be immediate or
overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours
to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular
army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among
the public was probably narrowly based. C [Sir Richard
Dearlove, chief of the British secret
Intelligence service] reported on his recent
talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift
in attitude. Military action was now seen as
inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through
military action, justified by the conjunction of
terrorism and WMD.
But the intelligence
and facts were being fixed around the
policy. The NSC [National
Security Council, i.e. Condoleeza
Rice] had no
patience
with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing
material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was
little discussion in Washington of the aftermath
after military action. CDS said that military planners would brief
CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and
Bush on 4 August. The two broad US options were: (a) Generated Start. A slow
build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour)
air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the
south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation
plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).(b) Running Start. Use forces already in
theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign,
initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead
time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning
even earlier. A hazardous option. The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential,
with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for
either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were
also important, but less vital. The three main
options for UK involvement were: (i) Basing in Diego Garcia and
Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.(ii) As above, with maritime and air
assets in addition. (iii) As above, plus a land contribution
of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in
Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down
two Iraqi divisions. The Defence Secretary said that the US had
already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure
on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he
thought the most likely timing in US minds for
military action to begin was January, with the
timeline beginning 30 days before the US
Congressional elections. The Foreign Secretary [Jack Straw]
said he would discuss this with Colin
Powell this week. It seemed clear that
[President George W]
Bush had made up his mind to take
military action, even if the timing was not yet
decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not
threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability
was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran.
We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam
to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This
would also help with the legal justification for
the use of force. The Attorney-General [Lord
Goldsmith] said that the desire
for regime change was
not a legal base for
military action. There were three
possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian
intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and
second could not be the base in this case. Relying
on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be
difficult. The situation might of course
change. The Prime Minister [Tony Blair] said
that it would make a big difference politically and
legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN
inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in
the sense that it was the regime that was producing
the WMD. There were different strategies for
dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political
context were right, people would support regime
change. The two key issues were whether the
military plan worked and whether we had the
political strategy to give the military plan the
space to work. On the first, CDS said that we did not know
yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military
were continuing to ask lots of questions. For instance, what were the consequences, if
Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not
collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that
Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on
Israel, added the Defence Secretary. The Foreign Secretary thought the US would
not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced
that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK
interests converged. But on the political strategy,
there could be US/UK differences. Despite US
resistance, we should explore discreetly the
ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball
with the UN. John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would
allow the inspectors back in only when he thought
the threat of military action was real. The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime
Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would
need to decide this early. He cautioned that many
in the US did not think it worth going down the
ultimatum route. It would be important for the
Prime Minister to set out the political context to
Bush. Conclusions: (a) We should work on the
assumption that the UK would take part in any
military action. But we needed a fuller picture
of US planning before we could take any firm
decisions. CDS should tell the US military that
we were considering a range of options.(b) The Prime Minister would revert on
the question of whether funds could be spent in
preparation for this operation. (c) CDS would send the Prime Minister
full details of the proposed military campaign
and possible UK contributions by the end of the
week. (d) The Foreign Secretary would send the
Prime Minister the background on the UN
inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum
to Saddam. He would also send the Prime Minister
advice on the positions of countries in the
region especially Turkey, and of the key EU
member states. (e) John Scarlett would send the Prime
Minister a full intelligence update. (f) We must not ignore the legal issues:
the Attorney-General would consider legal advice
with FCO/MOD legal advisers. (I have written separately to commission
this follow-up work.) MATTHEW RYCROFT |