"The chortling claims of Nato's smirking spokesman Jamie Shea and a succession of allied generals that the Yugoslav military suffered 10,000 casualties and a third of their 400-plus tanks had been destroyed by air strikes, have proven ludicrously wrong."

- Peter Worthington, Toronto Sun, July 21, 1999

Nato "victory" more like a disaster

By PETER WORTHINGTON

ECAUSE Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic capitulated after 78 days of Nato/U.S. air strikes, there's a growing feeling that those who warned air power alone can't win wars were wrong.

Even the current guru of military history, John Keegan, has acknowledged that his original view that air power alone couldn't win Kosovo was wrong. The likes of University of Calgary historian David Bercuson and various media commentators quickly adjusted to the new line that air power, indeed, could win wars.

While there's justifiable relief at Milosevic's so-called "surrender," it is far from proof that air power alone can win a war. On the contrary, Kosovo tends to reinforce the view that in a real war, air power while significant, even vital, cannot do it alone.

Still, the new "mythology" persists. Alistair Horne in Britain's Spectator put it wryly: "This unique victory has proved the old adage about truth being the first casualty."

Despite Nato's spin-doctoring and disinformation (yes, disinformation) it's clear that the Yugoslav Army, far from being beaten, ravaged, demoralized, is virtually intact with astonishingly little "collateral damage.

The chortling claims of Nato's smirking spokesman Jamie Shea and a succession of allied generals that the Yugoslav military suffered 10,000 casualties and a third of their 400-plus tanks had been destroyed by air strikes, have proven ludicrously wrong. Revised assessments now suggest the Serb military suffered some 400 casualties, and lost maybe 13 tanks. What Nato aircraft and rockets "destroyed," after some 40,000 sorties, were mostly dummy tanks, armoured vehicles, aircraft, missiles sites, guns.

Our side was shocked when the Serbian army withdrew from Kosovo virtually unscathed - equipment in top shape, morale high, troops more indignant than relieved at Milosevic's "betrayal."

The relatively few Western journalists in Kosovo at the time of Slobo's "surrender" (if that's what it was) reported the lack of damage to the Serb military - individuals like the BBC's intrepid John Simpson and Scott Taylor, publisher of the military magazine Esprit de Corps. On reflection, Nato's air "victory" may not have been all that was hoped. The political front collapsed, not the military.

Judging from inflated rhetoric when the "war" started, the end result was closer to disaster than victory. The original mandate of 19 Nato countries cajoled and coerced by the U.S. was to save Kosovo's Albanians from slaughter or being driven from their homes. When what was initially intended to be a "weekend war" to "bluff" Milosevic into quickly backing down and complying with Nato demands didn't work, Nato revised its goal to enabling refugees to return home. This, after untold thousands were slaughtered, villages razed, and a million refugees in flight. All as a consequence of Nato's war. Some victory.

While Milosevic is back to being reviled by a huge number of Serbians, there's also quiet gloating by Serb nationalists that "smart" bombs and smarter pilots had been duped by inflated replicas of tanks, dummy aircraft and fake missile sites. Nato's war from three miles in the sky mostly hit civilian targets and empty military buildings.

"Victory" loses lustre when one realizes that Nato countries collectively represent almost half of the world's GNP against a threadbare country of 10 million whose national budget is one-fifteenth the annual budget of the Pentagon. (The Wall Street Journal.)

Indeed, was Kosovo a victory?

Inevitably, Milosevic will be replaced - a good thing, but a costly way to do it. Still, most of his peace terms were met: Kosovo supposedly remains part of Yugoslavia; a referendum on Kosovo's independence has been scrapped; Nato is pledged to disarm the KLA.

This latter is unlikely. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright insists the KLA will be "demilitarized" which, to Albanians, means giving up their uniforms but not their weapons, apart from a token number to save Nato's face.

Now it's Serbs living in Kosovo who need protecting from vengeful Albanians. Ironically, Serbs who didn't flee after "peace" were those who had no reason to, since they committed no atrocities or crimes against Albanians. They should have known better. Innocence is no defence against ethnic vengeance.

"Success" has persuaded U.S. President Bill Clinton to pledge that anywhere ethnic cleansing and/or atrocities occur in the future, the U.S. will intervene - rather, one supposes, like the "mythical" war against terrorism wherever it rears its head that Clinton vowed after the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. How many wars can be won at an altitude of 15,000 feet with no casualties and no ground troops?

What should be of concern in the Balkans is the Yugoslav Army, undamaged and unrepentant, now lurking in the mountains, able to someday intervene in Kosovo if it wishes, perhaps when the Nato support is scaled down. Consider: When America is deeply embroiled in some future overseas adventure, what would happen if the Serb military picked that moment to reoccupy Kosovo? Just wondering.