Conversation, October 17, 1944 Present: Marshal I. V. Stalin - Mr. V. H. Molotov, People's
Commissar for Foreign Affairs
- General of the Armies Antonov
- Mr. Pavlov, Soviet interpreter
The American ambassador, Mr.
Harriman - Major General John R. Deane
- Mr. Edward Page, Second Secretary
of Embassy
-
Subject:
"Exploration"Marshall Stalin handed to the
Ambassador a list of the Soviet
requirements in the Far East. (Translation
of list attached.) The Ambassador inquired
whether the Russians had storage capacity
available for the supplies contained in
the list, especially for the fuel, or
would it be necessary to build additional
capacity. Marshal Stalin stated that they
bad some capacity but that additional
storage space must be built. Mr. Molotov
remarked that this question was foreseen
in the list. With respect to item 15 on
the list, General Antonov stated that the
landing strips listed were similar to
those at Poltava. The Ambassador inquired
to what use the Soviets contemplated
putting the landing craft listed. Marshal
Stalin stated that first the Amur would be
crossed and thereafter as the Army so
desired. It was possible that they would
be needed on the Sungare River. The
Ambassador asked whether he was correct in
his understanding that the total tonnage
of food, oil, etc. would take care of the
American Air Force as well as the Soviet
Air Force in the area. Marshal Stalin
replied in the affirmative. The Ambassador
stated that the list must be studied and
then General Deane would be ready to have
conversations with General Antonov.
Marshal Stalin said that Mr. Mikoyan would
also participate in these meeting. The
Ambassador said that the availability of
the types of supplies enumerated in the
list as well as shipping schedules would
have to be considered. He would take up
this question when he reached Washington.
He inquired whether it was contemplated by
the Soviet Government to bring as much as
possible via Pacific ports and whether the
ports in the west were also to be used.
Marshal Stalin stated that it would be
difficult to transport the supplies via
the western ports since troops,
ammunition, and artillery be moved to the
east and the Soviet Government had only
one railroad at its disposal. The Ambassador inquired whether some
shipments could be started before the
troop movements. The Marshal replied that
he did not know. It was desired to start
the movement of ammunition at once. He
requested General Antonov to look into
this matter. The Ambassador stated that he noticed
that no bombs were included on the list
and that therefore he had assumed that
they would be supplied by the Soviets. The
Marshal replied in the affirmative but
added that this was so as far as the
Soviet Air Force was concerned. He
explained that the list comprised only a
two months' reserve. With respect to
current needs, the Soviet Government would
undertake to supply all current needs,
including bombs for aircraft. He indicated
that he thought it would be necessary for
technical reasons for the United States to
supply the bombs for its Air Force. The
Ambassador remarked that the American Air
Force had had some experience with Soviet
bombs which had been satisfactory and
asked whether it might not be possible to
use them in the Far East. The Marshal
stated that if the Soviet bombs were
suitable for American aircraft it would be
quite agreeable to him to supply them. The Ambassador inquired whether it
would be safe to store the supplies
enumerated in the list in the Vladivostok
area, or whether it was intended to move
them from the north. Marshal Stalin
explained that the supplies would be
stored in a valley 100 to 150 kilometers
north of Vladivostok and also in the
Komsomolsk area. He commented that in the
initial stages of the war against Japan it
would be necessary to bomb Japan from the
Vladivostok and Primoria area. It would be
more feasible, however, to bomb northern
Japan from Komsomolsk and Sakhalin.
Pursuit planes would be used primarily to
protect the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The
Japanese would of course attack the
railroad by air during the first stages of
the war, but when the Russian invasion
proceeded southward there would be less
need to protect the railroad. The Ambassador inquired whether the
Soviet Commands would move anti-aircraft
to the Far East to protect the airfields
and other installations. Marshal Stalin
stated that they would be able to do
so. The Ambassador stated that when General
Deane had spoken the other night he had
advanced certain thoughts of the Chiefs of
Staff on the role the Russian armed forces
might play in the Far Eastern war. He
continued that he would be interested to
learn the Marshal's reaction to General
Deane's preliminary suggestion. The
Marshal requested General Deane to repeat
his remarks. General Deane stated that the Chiefs of
Staff had suggested the following Soviet
objectives in their order of priority: - To secure the Trans-Siberian
Railroad and the Vladivostok and
Komsomolsk area.
- To establish a United States-Soviet
Strategic Air Force, this airforce to
bomb Japan Proper and to interdict
Japanese communications lines to the
mainland.
- The Soviet land operations to
destroy the Japanese forces in
Manchuria.
- Concurrently, to seoure the route
across the Pacific in order to
safeguard supplies and to open up the
Port of Vladivostok.
Marshal Stalin asked whether the
American Chiefs of Staff had joint land
operations under consideration The
Ambassador replied that only Soviet land
operations in Manchuria were
contemplated. The Marshal said: "If we are thinking
seriously about defeating the Japanese, we
cannot be limited to the Manchurian
region. We shall strike direct blows from
different directions in Manchuria. But to
have real results we must develop
outflanking movements - blows at Kalgan
and Peking. Otherwise the assaults in
Manchuria alone will produce no important
results. I do not believe that the major
battles will be so much in Manchuria as in
the south where Japanese troops are to be
expected to be found when they withdraw
from China. The problem that faces us is
to prevent the Japanese from withdrawing
from China into Manchuria. Our objective
is to see to it that the Japanese forces
in China cannot be used by the Japanese in
Manchuria. That is my observation.
Regarding the other objectives set forth
by General Deane - I have no
objection." General Deane inquired whether the
Peking operations would be amphibious
through Tsientsin or by land through
Mongolia. The Marshal indicated on a map
that they would be outflanking movements
through Ulan-Bator and Kalgan, following
the "old Mongol route". The Ambassador inquired whether it
would be of interest to him if United
States forces occupied the northern Kurile
Islands in order to secure the supply
route, at least to Nikolaevsk and other
northern ports. The Marshal replied that
that would he would be of great interest
to the Soviet Government. The Ambassador
continued that the question would then be:
How soon could the port of Vladivostock be
reopened? There was one American proposal
to the effect that southern Sakhalin
should be cleared of the Japanese by
Soviet land operations. Was this
suggestion of interest? Marshal Stalin
again replied in the affirmative, He
continued that the sea positions should be
strengthened and then the northern Korean
ports should be occupied by Soviet land
and land and sea forces, He remarked that
the Soviets had some naval forces in the
area - 50 or more submarines and a few
destroyers. He added that the Soviet Navy
was well acquainted with the Japan Sea -
Soviet submarines were continually
operating in these waters. Conferences
must be arranged between officers of the
United States Navy and the Soviet naval
representatives in the Far Eastern area.
The Ambassador inquired whether the
Marshal wished to have United States naval
vessels in the Japan Sea. Stalin replied
in the affirmative. Marshal Stalin remarked that the
Japanese would probably make their first
attack on Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk
and possibly on Sakhalin, but their main
effort would be against the first two
named ports in order to occupy the
airfields there. The Ambassador inquired
whether, when the Japanese began to
realize that the Soviets were building up
their army in the Far Eastern area, they
would initiate hostilities. The Marshal
replied that he did not know but that it
was characteristic of the Japanese to take
the initiative. The Ambassador indicated the Kamchatka
area on the map and said that although it
was not yet decided, plans had been
prepared for the seizure of the northern
Kurile Islands next spring. The Marshal
indicated his approval and stated that if
the northern Kurile Islands were occupied
the passage through the islands would be
secured for the United States Navy.
Certain of the islands must be taken. The
Ambassador explained that the plans
envisaged the seizure primarily of the
northern third of the islands. The
Ambassador inquired whether there were any
good ports on the eastern coast of
Sakhalin. Stalin said that the ports were
weak. Good ports existed in Kamchatka and
also at Sovietskaya-Gavan. The Ambassador
inquired whether there were many plans to
improve the Sakhalin ports. The Marshal
said that all plans had been concentrated
on improving the facilities of
Sovietskaya-Gavan. The Ambassador asked if
the American Navy seized the northern
Kurile Islands before the entrance of the
Soviet Union into the war against Japan,
would it be a wise move? Marshal Stalin
stated that this would undoubtedly be of
great advantage to the Allies. The
Ambassador stated that on the other hand
if the islands were not occupied before
Russia's entry into the war, the ports and
airfields in the Kamchatka area would be
of great help in the operation. The
Marshal said that of course it would be of
real value to have bases in that area. The
Ambassador continued that he did not know
whether General Arnold wished to base very
long range bombers in Kamchatka bases in
view of the bad weather. However, if
Marshal Stalin was ready to consider this
matter, the Ambassador would take up the
question with General Arnold. The Marshal
indicated approval but stated that all the
American Navy had bases in Kamchatka it
must also have air protection. The
Ambassador stated that the Navy would
desire to have navy and air bases in
Kamchatka. The Marshal said that this
whole question must be thoroughly studied.
The Soviet naval representatives must be
brought into the picture. The Ambassador
stated that he knew that Admiral King
wished to have bases in the area under
discussion. The Marshal appeared to have
no objection to this desire and remarked
that it seemed to him that the occupation
of the northern Kurile Islands seemed to
be the key to the operation of the United
States Navy in that part of the
Pacific. The Ambassador inquired whether the
Soviet Government had studied the question
of opening up the route to Vladivostok.
Stalin replied that the first
consideration was to defeat the Japanese
in the area. The Japanese would try to
keep the ports isolated in view of the
factories, shipyards, and repair
facilities in Vladivostok. The Ambassador stated that on October
15 the Marshal had spoken of Japanese
penetration in Primoria and of certain
initial reverses. How deep did the Marshal
contemplate such reverses? The Marshal
replied that in war one must figure on
everything - the good and the bad. It
could not be precluded that Vladivostok
would be taken by the Japanese. This would
not be easy for the Japanese but it must
be taken into account. In reply to the
Ambassador's question whether the Russians
feared the cutting of the railroad just
west of Khabarovsk, Stalin stated that it
would be very difficult for the enemy to
cut the railroad. They might bomb it but
the Russian defenses were strong. They
were also strong in the Vladivostok area,
but combined Japanese land and sea
operations before the Russians had time to
finish their defensive preparations of
Vladivostok might make it difficult to
hold the city. If Vladivostok fell, then
Sovietskaya-Gavan would be of prime
importance. The Ambassador inquired how many months
of the year Nicolaus and Sovietskaya-Gavan
were open. The Marshal stated that
Petropavlovsk like Vladivostok was
ice-free on an average of nine to ten
months a year. Sovietskaya-Gavan was open
six to seven months a year. lie added that
the Soviet naval authorities could give
accurate information on this question. General Deane stated that American
operations contemplated the invasion of
Japan in the closing months of 1945. Prior
to these operations the American armies
would soften up Japan to the greatest
extent by cutting off supplies from the
south. As Marshal Stalin had outlined his
operations, it would seem that the two
plans were in coordination. The Ambassador
stated that when the United States had
placed emphasis on strategic bombing, it
had no knowledge of the intensive plans
which marshal Stalin bad just outlined. He
now desired to know whether the Russians
placed higher priority on the buildup for
the ground forces or on strategic bombing.
The Marshal replied "both at the same
time". He continued that as soon as the
Russians struck in the
Manchurian-Mongolian regions, the Japanese
would attempt to move troops to Korea.
Their retreat must be cut off.
Furthermore, if Japanese troops were cut
off in China, the Allied task would be
greatly facilitated. The Ambassador said that General Deane
had explained that the American Staff had
plans to make landing operations on the
China Coast in order to take airfields but
said did not contemplate further
operations in that area of China. Did
Marshal Stalin agree with these plans? The
Marshal stated that the Americans would
cut off the Japanese garrisons on the
southern islands and that the Russians
would cut off the land forces in China. He
agreed that this was the proper plan -
however, it would be difficult to effect
it. The Marshal stated that the plan to
invade w Japan was a "grand undertaking".
The Ambassador inquired whether the
Marshal desired any more information on
the American plans. The Marshal replied
that everything was clear to him. The
Soviet requirements must be studied in
Washington. Some general agreement
regarding the war must be reached. The
Ambassador inquired whether the Marshal
contemplated a political or military
agreement. The Marshal answered "both".
(See supplementary memorandum.) The
Ambassador stated that preparatory to the
agreement and in the meantime it was
important for the American military and
naval staffs to exchange information,
especially with respect to where joint
operations were envisaged end for planning
for the various operations where the two
countries were mutually concerned. The
Marshal agreed. The Ambassador explained
that when the Soviet and. American naval
representatives got together on the
Petropavlovsk plan it was possible that
the Americans might wish to send an
officer or two there to see and study what
could be done. The Marshal again agreed
and stated that this whole question must
be carefully gone into. However, the need
for utmost secrecy must be observed. The
Marshal stated that he wished to explain
why he was so insistent on security and
caution. If there is any indiscretion he
feared that information might leak out to
the press which would cause the Japanese
to embark on premature adventures as a
result of which the valuable Vladivostok
area might be lost. If Vladivostok were
lost before major operations commenced, it
would be extremely unfortunate for both
countries. The Russians must move a
certain number of divisions to the Far
East. They must refresh their air force
and send some tank corps to the area.
After that was done the Marshal stated
that he would not have such great fears of
indiscretion or leaks to the Press. Then
neither Petropavlovsk nor Vladivostok
would be lost. He cautioned the taking of
notes or writing of memoranda such as that
before him.* Stenographers and secretaries
were eager to tell news to their friends
and thus military secrets no longer
remained military secrets. "I am a
cautious old man," he said. The Ambassador stated that he wished to
bring up the subject of the delivery of
the four-engine bombers and the training
of crews. Did the Marshal wish to start
this project immediately? He continued
that we wished to conform with the
Marshal's wishes, and although we were
ready to begin deliveries, me wished not
to press the matter until the Marshal had
indicated his approval. The Marshal stated
that he was very much interested in the
proposal and that he would inform the
Ambassador when the Soviet authorities
were ready. This, he thought, would be in
about two weeks. He indicated that he
wished to receive 10 to 20 bombers as a
first installment and then a flow depended
upon the training of pilots and the
readiness of the fields. He explained that
the present Soviet fields were small and
must be enlarged. The Ambassador inquired
whether the four-engine bombers would be
reserved for the Far East for the build-up
in that area or would they also be used
against Germany. The Marshal stated that
they would only be used in the Far East.
"It would not be honest on our part to
move them to the west," he said. The
Marshal inquired up to how many units
could be released to the Soviet Union. The
Ambassador replied that the United States
would wish to know how many the Soviet
Government desired. The hundred had been
discussed. General Deane explained that 10
bomber groups had been envisaged for the
Far Eastern operation, consisting of 6
American groups and 4 Soviet groups. The
total number of planes for Soviet groups
was 200 operation bombers and 100 in
reserve, as well as 300 long-range P-51
fighters and 150 in reserve. However, the
question depended upon the logistics and
the supply of gasoline. The eventual size
of the Soviet Air Force in the last
analysis would of course depend on these
logistics. There would be many American
planes available once the war with Germany
and terminated. The question was where
would they he used and how would they be
supplied? The number of fields and
supplies available, as well of course as
the desires of the Soviet Government, were
the principal factors involved. The
Marshal stated that the size of the Soviet
Air Force would be restricted first by
fuel considerations and then by the number
of fields available,. The ambassador
stated that the plans thus far considered
had only been put forward as a subject of
discussion, something to work out and to
see exactly what would be feasible. The
plan was merely a proposal. * Mr Eden's memorandum. General Deane stated that there were
various phases of the Far Eastern
operations which must be thoroughly
studied. American railway, naval,
military, air and other experts were
needed and should meet with their Soviet
counterparts. This should be done as soon
as possible so as to be ready for the
agreement referred to above. The Marshal
stated that that would have to be
done. The Ambassador stated that if Stalin so
desired he would withdraw and destroy all
the copies of the memorandum the Marshal
had mentioned. The Marshal stated that it
was up to the Ambassador to take whatever
seourity measures he saw fit. The
Ambassador replied that he was not afraid
of the type of memorandum the Marshal had
referred to as of talk among uninformed
persons. The Marshal said that such
persons usually obtained their information
from sources close to the military
authorities and that such persons were
always eager to pass on the latest news.
The Ambassador suggested that
consideration be given by General Deane
and the Soviet authorities to work out a
"cover plan" in respect to the four-engine
bombers for Soviet account. If the bombers
started corning to The Soviet Union it
might be advisable to work out a plan to
the effect that they were going to Russia
for the purpose of attacking Germany by
Soviet air forces. The Marshal rallied
that this could be arranged. The
Ambassador continued that the same thing
might be done regarding the delivery of
equipment. He explained that one of the
greatest considerations in the United
States, a really burning question, was
whether Russia was going to join us in the
war against Japan. Many people were
guessing - right and wrong. The Marshal
stated that after the three months'
preparation noted above, he would indicate
who was doing the right guessing. The Ambassador stated that he knew that
the President and his Chiefs of Staff
would be very grateful and extremely
interested in what Marshal Stalin had said
and would immediately start working on the
questions raised. Stalin stated that what
had been said at Tehran were not empty
words. The Ambassador seed that the
President never had a moment's doubt that
they were, but that now that were getting
down to detailed plans it was much more
interesting. He knew that the President
would be grateful for the progress made on
actual plans. The Marshal replied: "We
must break the Japanese spine." The
Ambassador concluded he conversation by
stating that it was his understanding that
General Deane would continue conversations
with General Antonov and that the American
naval representatives would enter into
talks with the Soviet naval authorities on
the question. Marshal Stalin said this
should be done. EP: nn Copy to General Deane. | 
write to David
Irving